

REVIEWED BY *John*

DATE 2/14/88

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROGERGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Jupiters in Italy and Turkey

1. The NATO Background. Jupiters were introduced into Italy and Turkey pursuant to a decision taken at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in December 1957. This decision was publicized in paragraphs 18-21 of the Communiqué issued at the end of that meeting, which read as follows:

"18. The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the USSR should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.

"19. As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defenses. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

"20. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

"21. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. The NATO military authorities have been requested to submit to the Council at an early date their recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defense... The Council in permanent session will consider the various questions involved."

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2. The Italian Agreement. By agreement dated March 26, 1959 the United States undertook to deploy in Italy two squadrons of Jupiter IRBMs consisting of fifteen (15) missiles per squadron, to be at the disposal of SACEUR for the execution of NATO plans and policies in peace as well as war. The decision to launch would be taken by SACEUR only in agreement with the Governments of the US and Italy. Warheads for these missiles were to remain in the custody of US military custodial units established for this purpose.

3. The Turkish Agreement. Negotiations with Turkey culminated in an exchange of notes in October, 1959, providing for one squadron of Jupiter IRBMs consisting of fifteen (15) missiles to be stationed in Turkey. As in the case of the Italian agreement, the IRBMs are under operational control of SACEUR in peace and war and SACEUR would take a decision to launch only in agreement with Governments of the US and Turkey. The US also retains custody of the warheads.

4. The Military Requirement. As indicated above, the NATO decision to deploy IRBMs was taken in the light of the developing Soviet long-range missile threat which had been dramatized by launching of the first Sputnik in October 1957. The implementation of this decision, in terms of military requirements, was placed in the hands of General Norstad as SACEUR. The judgment that such missiles were required from the military point of view in Italy and Turkey was his determination. The Department is not aware that this determination was based upon any known targetting by the Soviets of specific sites in the two countries. It must however have been assumed that key targets in those countries would be subjected to the Soviet missile threat.

5. Italian and Turkish Decisions. The Prime Ministers of Italy and Turkey participated in the unanimous decision at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting. Responsible authorities of the two Governments in the subsequent period of discussions with SACEUR expressed an interest in having IRBMs deployed on their territory. The ironing out of many questions of detail necessarily involved in such deployment explains the considerable length of time which ensued between the Heads of Government Meeting and the actual signing of the agreements. The decisions of the Italian and Turkish Governments were those of free partners entering willingly into a project in the mutual Alliance interest and in fulfillment of agreed Alliance objectives serving the maintenance of peace.

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6. Obligations of NATO Members. The deployment of IRMs, in pursuance of the Heads of Government decision, was in fulfillment of the obligations of the members of NATO, as laid down in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949. This article reads as follows:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

William E. Brubeck  
Executive Secretary

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